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I  
I n  a  r e c e n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h i s  j o u r n a l l  E v e l y n  
P l u h a r  h a s  c r i t i c i z e d  R e g a n ' s  r i g h t s  v i e w  f o r  i t s  l a c k  
o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n a r y  f o r c e  a n d  h a s  f u r t h e r  s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  t h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  d e f e c t  m a y  b e  r e p a i r e d  b y  
e m p l o y i n g  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  m e t h o d  t h a t  i s  d e v e l o p e d  
b y  A l a n  G e w i r t h .
2  
W h i l e  I  l a r g e l y  a g r e e  w i t h  
P l u h a r ' s  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n s  o f  R e g a n ' s  
t h e o r y ,  I  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  G e w i r t h ' s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
m e t h o d  p r o v i d e s  a  s o l u t i o n  h e r e .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e r e  a r e  
g o o d  r e a s o n s  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  G e w i r t h  o f f e r s  u s  n o  
m o r a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  m e t h o d  a t  a l l .  I f  t h i s  i s  s o ,  a s  I  w i l l  
a r g u e  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n ,  o u r  m o r a l  b e l i e f s  h a v e  t o  
b e  s u s t a i n e d  i n  a n o t h e r  w a y .  A l t h o u g h  f u l l y  
d e v e l o p i n g  s u c h  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  w i t h i n  t h e  s p a n  o f  a  
s h o r t  a r t i c l e  i s  i m p o s s i b l e ,  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  i n d i c a t e  i n  
s e c t i o n  I I I  i n  w h a t  d i r e c t i o n  w e  s h o u l d  l o o k  f o r  i t .  
P H I L O S O P H Y  
B e t w e e n  t h e  S p e c i e s  
Pluhar on lUethods or Justification 
II 
Gewirth's central aim is to show that "every agent, 
by the fact of engaging in action, is logically 
committed to the acceptance of certain evaluative 
and deontic judgments and ultimately of a supreme 
moral principle."} The first part of this statement 
(before "and ultimately") is relatively 
uncontroversial. Within decision theory, for 
instance, it is a hardly disputed fact that "every agent 
must hold or accept that his freedom and well-being 
are necessary goods."4 
The latter judgment has a clearly deontic 
character, but it is not yet a moral judgment. 
Nonetheless, Gewirth believes that it forms a 
necessary and sufficient basis for the derivation of 
moral judgments. To show this, he argues first that it 
implies that all agents must claim for themselves a 
right to freedom and well-being. Since Gewirth 
interprets "right" in a prudential sense here, there is 
still nothing new under the sun. The novelty is in 
the next step where Gewirth arrives at a moral 
conclusion by combining the prudential rights claim 
with the logical principle of universalizibility. The 
meaning of this principle is that, 
if some predicate P belongs to some subject S
 
because S has the property Q (where the
 
'because' is that of sufficient reason or
 
condition), then P must also belong to all other
 
subjects Sl, S2, ... Snthat have Q.5
 
If this principle is applied to the prudential rights 
claim, the result is something like this: if a person 
(S) has (or claims) a right to freedom and well-being 
(P) because this person is a rational agent (Q), then 
a right to freedom and well-being (P) belongs also to 
all other persons (Sl, S2, ... Sn) who are rational 
agents (Q). In other words, every rational agent must 
logically "accept the generalization that all 
prospective agents who have purposes they want to 
fulfill have the rights of freedom and well-being."6 
Pluhar seems to have no difficulties with the 
above reasoning. It can be proven, however, that, as 
Hare has put it, Gewirth "is guilty of a fallacy of 
equivocation" by identifying "claiming a right" with 
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"having a right."7 From the prudential judgment, "I 
claim for myself rights to freedom and well-being," 
one can wi th the help of the logical principle of 
universalizibility only infer a universalized prudential 
judgment and not a moral judgment. Adina 
Schwartz develops the same critique in an even more 
poignant way: 
Gewirth has only shown that each agent must 
claim rights [to freedom and well-being] for 
him/herself on prudential grounds. Therefore, 
each agent is only logically bound to admit that 
all other agents have sound prudential reasons 
for claiming those same rights for themselves. 
Having so judged, an agent can coherently 
assert that he/she does not want others to 
achieve their goals. Therefore, he/she can 
argue, while it is prudent for each of them to 
demand rights to freedom and well-being, it is 
rational for him/her to refuse to grant such 
rights to any other purposive agent. Since no 
inconsistency is involved here, Gewirth has not 
shown that any transition from prudence to 
morality is logically required.8 
Carol Belanger Grafton, 
Old·Fashiontd Animal Cuts. 
New York: Dover, 1987 
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P l u h a r  o n  M e t h o d s  o f  . l u s t i f i e a t i o n  
H e n c e ,  t h e  o n l y  t h i n g  t h a t  G e w i r t h  c a n  l o g i c a l l y  
d e m o n s t r a t e  i s  t h a t  
( a )  " t h e r e  i s  a  p r u d e n t i a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  o n  [ a n  
a g e n t ]  t o  s e e k  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a c h i e v i n g  h i s  
p u r p o s e s "  
i m p l i e s  
( b )  " t h e r e  i s  a  p r u d e n t i a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  o n  o t h e r  
s i m i l a r  a g e n t s  t o  s e e k  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  
a c h i e v i n g  t h e i r  p u r p o s e s . "  
I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  ( a )  d o e s  n o t  i m p l y  
( c )  " t h e r e  i s  a  r e q u i r e m e n t  o n  a n y o n e ,  i n c l u d i n g  
t h e  o r i g i n a l  a g e n t ,  t o  s e e k  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  
f o r  a c h i e v i n g  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  a n y o n e  e l s e  w h o  i s  
s i m i l a r l y  p l a c e d . " 9  
T o  m a k e  t h e  l e a p  f r o m  ( a )  t o  ( c )  o r ,  m o r e  
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  f r o m  ( b )  t o  ( c ) ,  l o g i c  c a n n o t  b e  e n o u g h ;  
w h a t  i s  a d d i t i o n a l l y  n e e d e d ,  i s  a n  e x t r a - l o g i c a l ,  
m o t i v a t i o n a l  a s s u m p t i o n .  N o w h e r e  i n  R e a s o n  a n d  
M o r a l i t y  i s  t h e r e  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  s u c h  a n  
a s s u m p t i o n .  O n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  G e w i r t h  s t u b b o r n l y  
s t i c k s  t o  h i s  i d e a  t h a t  " t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  t h e  
p r u d e n t i a l  t o  t h e  m o r a l  a n d  s o c i a l  . . .  i s  n o t  
m o t i v a t i o n a l ,  b u t  l o g i c a l "  ( 1 9 7 8 :  1 4 6 ) . 1 0  
I I I  
I n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  w e s t e r n  e t h i c s  t h e  " m o t i v a t i o n a l  
a s s u m p t i o n "  o f  m o r a l i t y  h a s  b e e n  s e a r c h e d  f o r  i n  
s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t i o n s .  O n e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
a t t r a c t i v e  s o l u t i o n  h a s  b e e n  t o  e q u a t e  i t  w i t h  
r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t . !  1  T h e r e  a r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  m a n y  
p r o b l e m s  w i t h  t h i s  v i e w ,  n o t  t h e  l e a s t  o f  t h e m  b e i n g  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  m u s t  d e n y  a m o r a l  s t a t u s  t o  a n i m a l s  
a n d  s o - c a l l e d  m a r g i n a l  h u m a n  c a s e s . l
2  
A n o t h e r  w a y  o u t  h a s  b e e n  t o  l i n k  t h e  
m o t i v a t i o n a l '  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  m o r a l i t y  w i t h  " n a t u r a l "  
s y m p a t h y  o r  b e n e v o l e n c e  ( c f .  H u m e ) .  T h i s  v i e w  i s  
a l s o  r i d d l e d  w , i t h  o b s t a c l e s :  n o t  o n l y  d o e s  i t  
p r e s u p p o s e  a  t o o - r o s y - t o - b e - t r u e  p i c t u r e  o f  h u m a n  
n a t u r e ,  i t s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  m o r a l  t h e o r y ,  
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ,  b o r d e r s  a t  a  p l e a  f o r  s e l f - d e n i a l .
1 3  
W h a t e v e r  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n a l  s o u r c e  o f  m o r a l i t y  
m a y  b e ,  m o r a l  p h i l o s o p h e r s  h a v e  o f t e n  t h o u g h t  t h a t  
t o  p i n p o i n t  i t ,  i s  t o  j u s t i f y  m o r a l i t y .  I n  t h i s  t h e y  m a y  
h a v e  o v e r l o o k e d  t h e  q u i t e  s i m p l e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  f a c t  
t h a t  e x t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n  m a y  c h a n g e  i n t o  i n t r i n s i c  
m o t i v a t i o n  a n d  v i c e  v e r s a .  A  c h i l d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  m a y  
i n i t i a l l y  b e  o n l y  e x t r i n s i c a l l y  m o t i v a t e d  t o  p l a y  t h e  
p i a n o  - i t  r e c e i v e s  s o m e  c a n d y  a f t e r  i t s  d a i l y  
e x e r c i s e s  - b u t  m a y  a f t e r  s o m e  t i m e  ( m o n t h s ,  y e a r s )  
l e a r n  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  p l a y i n g  o f  t h e  p i a n o  
i n t r i n s i c a l l y .  T h e  p o s i t i v e  r e i n f o r c e m e n t  o f  t h e  
r e g u l a r  c a n d y  s u p p l y  b e c o m e s  t h e n  s u p e r f l u o u s  - i n  
f a c t ,  t h e  c h i l d  m a y  l o s e  i t s  a p p e t i t e  f o r  c a n d y  
a l t o g e t h e r .
1 4  
I t  i s  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i m a g i n e  t h a t  a  s i m i l a r  
m o t i v a t i o n - s h i f t  o c c u r s  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  m o r a l  
e d u c a t i o n :  i n i t i a l l y  c h i l d r e n  m a y  a b i d e  b y  m o r a l  
r u l e s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  e x t r i n s i c  s a n c t i o n s  t h a t  
a c c o m p a n y  t h e s e  r u l e s ,  b u t  i n  t h e  e n d  m o s t  y o u n g  
p e o p l e  l e a r n  t o  r e s p e C t  m o r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  w h a t  
t h e y  a r e  a n d  n o t  f o r  w h a t  t h e y  m a y  l e a d  t o  w h e n  
t h e y  a r e  ( d i s ) o b e y e d . l
5  
I f  t h i s  i s  a  m o r e  o r  l e s s  c o r r e c t  g e n e r a l  a c c o u n t  o f  
m o r a l  e d u c a t i o n ,  t o  j u s t i f y  m o r a l  r u l e s  b y  r e f e r r i n g  
b a c k  t o  t h ' e i r  m o t i v a t i o n a l  o r i g i n  i s  n o ' t  o n l y  
s u p e r f l u o u s ,  b u t ,  m o r e o v e r ,  l i t e r a l l y  a  r e g r e s s i o n  i n t o  
c h i l d h o o d .  T h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  t o  s t i c k  t o  t h e  re~ult o f  
o u r  m o r a l  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h i s  a s  t h e  
b e d r o c k  o f  m o r a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h i s  
a l t e r n a t i v e  i m p l i e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  i t  i s  b e s i d e  t h e  
p o i n t  t o  t r y  t o  j u s t i f y  o u r  m o r a l  r e p u g n a n c e  a t  t h e  
s i g h t  o f  h o o d l u m s  p o u r i n g  g a s o l i n e  o v e r  a  c a t  a n d  
i g n i t i n g  i t . ! 6  F o r  t h a t  i s  h o w  w e  a r e  b r o u g h t  u p  t o  
f e e l  a b o u t  t h e s e  t h i n g s  a n d  i t  i s  h a r d  t o  s e e  h o w  a n y  
a r g u m e n t  w o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  c h a n g e  o r  e r a s e  t h i s  
f e e l i n g .  
M o r a l  p h i l o s o p h e r s  w o u l d  b e  q u i c k  t o  o b j e c t  h e r e  
t h a t  t h i s  w a y  o f  r e a s o n i n g  l e a d s  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y  t o  
t h e  l e g i t i m a t i o n  o f  a l l  k i n d s  o f  p r e j u d i c e s .  I n  t h i s  
t h e y  a r e  u n d o u b t e d l y  r i g h t :  w i t h o u t  a n y  a t t e m p t  a t  
.  s y s t e m i z a t i o n  a n d  " c o r r e c t i o n , "  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  o u r  
m o r a l  u p b r i n g i n g  m a y  c o m e  c l o s e  t o  a n  " a n y t h i n g  
g o e s " a d m o n i t i o n .  T h e r e f o r r  p h i l o s o p h e r s  s u c h  a s  
R a w l s  h a v e  s u g g e s t e d  - a n d  R e g a n  c o n c u r s  w i t h  
R a w l s  i n  t h i s  - t h a t  w e  s h o u l d  t r y  t o  a t t a i n  a  b r o a d  
r e f l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  b e t w e e n  ( a )  t h e  m o r a l  
c o n v i c t i o n s  t h a t  o r i g i n a t e  i n  o u r  l i p b r i n g i n g ,  ( b )  
s o m e  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  i m p a r t i a l i t y  p r i n c i p l e ,  a n d  ( c )  a  
B e t w e e n  t h e  S p e c i e s  2 5 7  
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range of relevant background theories (e.g., a theory 
about the "human condition").l7 Inspiring as this 
reflective equilibrium proposal may be, it is, as, 
amongst others, Pluhar's critique of Regan's theory 
has shown, doubtful whether it can really lead us to 
accept one specific moral view (and not a class of 
mutually incompatible views). For this reason, I 
would like to conclude these reflections on methods 
of justification on a note that tries to incorporate 
Pluhar's critique of Regan. 
Pluhar especially takes issue with the emphasis 
that Regan puts on the impartiality principle. Regan 
thinks that this formal principle of justice can 
nonarbitrarily be filled out or given concrete form, 
which is precisely what Pluhar denies. Now, no 
moral philosopher can do away with the role the 
impartiality principle plays within morality, but that 
does not mean that, as Pluhar would readily agree, 
that role cannot be reinterpreted. What is meant 
here is that, instead of putting the impartiality 
principle forward as a foundational and, 
consequently, isolated principle, one could present it 
as incorporated in what Hare has called "secondarily 
evaluative words,"18 Le., value-terms that carry 
descriptive meaning with them. An appropriate 
example of such a term is "cruelty": the word is not 
only used to condemn certain acts, it also describes 
these acts (viz., acts of inflicting suffering). 
Moreover, it incorporates the impartiality principle, 
for cruelty is wrong whoever its victims may be; 
whether they are moral agents, marginal cases or 
animals makes, given the meaning of cruelty, no 
moral difference at all. 
It would take too long here to defend the view 
that the duty not to be cruel provides a reliable basis 
to assess our moral relationship with animals. In 
conclUSion, however, it is worthwhile to observe that 
the anti-cruelty view has never been given a fair 
chance. Both Regan and Singer, for instance, have 
brushed the view aside by claiming that cruelty 
necessarily makes reference to the mental state of 
the victimizer (their sadism or indifference), which 
renders this view "unoperationable."19 But, surely, it 
is possible to define cruelty without making any such 
reference, e.g., as the infliction of suffering against 
the will and against the interests of the victim. I 
grant that this definition may have problematic 
implications of its own, but at least it is, given the 
Fall 1988 258 
deadlock which seems to characterize the current 
animal ethics debate, an avenue for theoretical 
reflection that deserves to be explored more fully 
than it has been until now. 
I "Moral Agents and Moral Patients." Between the Species 4 
(1988), pp. 32-45. 
2 Alan Gewirth, Reason and Moralit:J. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978. 
3 Ibidem., p. x. 
4 Ibidem, p. 63. Decision theorists would, to be true, formulate 
this axiom in another way, but closer scrutiny of their and 
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differences are largely verbal. See in this respect, e.g., David 
Gauthier. Morals b:J Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 
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Gewirch's Echical Rationalism: Critical ES5a:Js wich a Repl:J b:J Alan 
Gewirch. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 52.58. 
8 Adina Schwartz. "Review: Reason and Moralit:J. By Alan 
Gewirth." Philosophical Relliew 88 (1979), p. 656. For a similar 
critique see Richard Brandt. "The Future of Ethics." Nous 15 
(1981), p. 40, and Loren Lomasky. Persons, Rights, and !he Moral 
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Rights and !he Moral Communiry, and Gregory Kavka. Hobbesian 
Moral and Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986. 
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"Animal Rights." CanadianJoumal of Philosoph:J 7 (1977), pp. 308­
325, and Tom Regan. "Narveson on Egoism and the Rights of 
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1 "  t ;  m  i i i ' :  
t 1 i 5 i m m - M h R  " " " U  ' . ! l ;  
P l u h a r  o n  M e t h o d s  o f  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  
1 3  S e e  o n c e  m o r e  L o m a s k y ,  O p .  c i t . ,  e s p .  p p .  1 3 - 2 7  a n d  5 3 - 5 4 ,  
a n d  a l s o  B e r n a r d  W i l l i a m s .  E t h i c s  a n d  t h e  L i m i t s  o f  M o r a l  
P h i l o s o p h y .  L o n d o n :  F o n t a n a  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 5 ,  p p .  7 5  f f .  F o r  a  c r i t i q u e  
o f  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  v i e w  o n  t h e  m o r a l  s t a t u s  o f  a n i m a l s  a n d  m a r g i n a l  
c a s e s ,  s e e  E v e l y n  P l u h a r .  " M u s t  a n  O p p o n e n t  o f  A n i m a l  R i g h t s  
a l s o  B e  a n  O p p o n e n t  o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s ? "  I n q u i r y  2 4  ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  p p .  
2 2 9 - 2 4 1 ,  a n d  T o m  R e g a n .  T h e  C a s e  f o r  A n i m a l  R i g h t s .  B e r k e l e y :  
U n i v e r s i r y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 3 .  N a t u r a l l y ,  I  d o  n o t  p r e s u m e  
t o  h a v e  o f f e r e d  a n y  r e a l  a r g u m e n t s  h e r e  a g a i n s t  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  o r  
a g a i n s t  t h e  c o n t r a c t a r i a n  t h e o r i e s  t h a t  a r e  m e n t i o n e d  i n  n o t e  1 0 .  
S u c h  a r g u m e n t s  l i e  c o m p l e t e l y  o u t s i d e  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h i s  
c o n t r i b u t i o n .  
1 4  F o r  m o r e  o n  t h i s ,  s e e  A l a s d a i r  M a c l n r y r e .  A f t e r  V i r t u e :  A  
S t u d y  i n  M o r a l  T h e o r y .  N o t r e  D a m e ,  I n d . :  U n i v e r s i r y  o f  N o t r e  
D a m e  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 1 ,  e s p .  p p .  1 7 5  f f .  
1 5  C f .  J o h n  R a w l s .  A  T h e o r y  o f  J u s t i c e .  H a r v a r d :  B e l k n a p ­
H a r v a r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 7 1 ,  e s p .  p p .  4 9 0 - 4 9 6 .  
1 6  T h e  e x a m p l e  i s  b o r r o w e d  f r o m  G i l b e r t  H a r m a n .  T h e  N a t u r e  
o f  M o r a l i t y .  N e w  Y o r k :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 7 7 ,  p p .  3 - 4 .  
1 7  C f .  J o h n  R a w l s .  " T h e  I n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  M o r a l  T h e o r y . "  
P r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  4 7  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  p p .  
5 - 2 2 ,  a n d  a l s o  N o r m a n  D a n i e l s .  " W i d e  R e f l e c t i v e  E q u i l i b r i u m  a n d  
T h e o r y  A c c e p t a n c e  i n  E t h i c s . "  J o u r n a l  o f  P h i l o s o p h y  7 6  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  
p p .  2 5 6 - 2 8 2 .  
1 8  R i c h a r d  M .  H a r e .  M o r a l  T h i n k i n g ;  I t s  M e t h o d ,  L e v e l s  a n d  
P o i n t .  O x f o r d :  C l a , r e n d o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p .  1 7 .  
1 9  T o m  R e g a n .  " C r u e l t y ,  K i n d n e s s ,  a n d  U n n e c e s s a r y  
S u f f e r i n g . "  P h i l o s o p h y  5 5 :  5 3 2 - 5 4 1 ,  a n d  P e t e r  S i n g e r .  " P r o l o g u e :  
E t h i c s  a n d  t h e  N e w  A n i m a l  L i b e r a t i o n , "  I n  D e f e n s e  o f  A n i m a l s .  
E d .  b y  S i n g e r .  O x f o r d :  B a s i l  B l a c k w e l l ,  1 9 8 5 ,  p p .  1 - 1 0 .  
N o w  6 0  p a g e s !  
N o t  o n l y  t h e  b e s t  w r i t i n g  o n  e t h i c s  a n d  a n i m a l s ,  
b u t  f i c t i o n ,  p o e t r y ,  a n d  a u t o b i o g r a p h y  
b y  l e a d i n g  a n i m a l l i b e r a t i o n i s t s  t o o !  
" B e t w e e n  t h e  S p e c i e s  i s  a  m u s t  f o r  a n y o n e 
  
w h o  f e e l s  w e  h a v e  t o  t o s s  a w a y  o u r  o l d  c o n c e p t i o n s 
  
a b o u t  a n i m a l s  a s  . . .  n o t  d e s e r v i n g  e t h i c a l  t r e a t m e n t , 
  
a n d  f i n d  a  w a y  o f  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e m  a s ,  p e r h a p s ,  p e e r s . " 
  
- J i m  S w a n  ( S h a m a n ' s  D r u m ) 
  
C o n t r i b u t i n g  E d i t o r s  i n c l u d e  P e t e r  S i n g e r ,  
M i c h a e l  F o x ,  B e r n a r d  R o l l i n  a n d  T o m  R e g a n .  
o  E n c l o s e d  i s  $ 1 5 . 0 0  f o r  a  o n e - y e a r  s u b s c r i p t i o n  t o  B e t w e e n  t h e  S p e c i e s .  
o  E n c l o s e d  i s  $ 3 . 0 0  f o r  a  s a m p l e  b a c k  i s s u e  o f  B e t w e e n  t h e  S p e c i e s .  
N a m e :  
S t r e e t :  
C i t y :  S t a t e :  
S a n  F r a n c i s c o  B a y  I n s t i t u t e  
P . O .  B o x  2 5 4  
B e r k e l e y ,  C a l i f o r n i a  9 4 7 0 1  
F a l l  1 9 8 8  2 5 9  
_  
_  
Z i p  C o d e :  _  
B e t w e e n  t h e  S p e c i e s  
